

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 1, 2026

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

No. 26-30182
Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

ROY LEE JONES, JR.,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:20-CR-156-2

Before WILLETT, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, *Circuit Judges*.

PER CURIAM:*

Roy Lee Jones, Jr., federal prisoner # 04095-509, appeals the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate release. In denying his motion, the district court found that Jones had demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances for release but found that Jones was not entitled to relief upon weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Jones argues that the district court erred in its weighing of the § 3553(a)

* This opinion is not designated for publication. *See* 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.

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factors insofar as it (i) failed to consider “critical post-sentencing developments” including his rehabilitation and his classification by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) as “minimum risk”; (ii) provided insufficient reasons for denying his motion; (iii) erred in finding that he had not yet served 50 percent of his sentence without recognizing the potential that he could be released to community custody earlier than the date upon which his 210-month sentence expires; and (iv) denied his motion based on the same § 3553(a) factors that the court cited in denying a previous compassionate release motion, despite a change in circumstances.

Jones has shown no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of his motion. *See United States v. Chambliss*, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). We assume that the district court considered Jones’s arguments and supporting evidence regarding his rehabilitation and BOP classification because he raised them in his motion and related pleadings and the district court expressly stated that it had carefully considered those pleadings. *See United States v. Batiste*, 980 F.3d 466, 479 (5th Cir. 2020). Indeed, the district court’s reasoned order indicates that it adequately considered and rejected the arguments that Jones raised in his motion in concluding that consideration of the § 3553(a) factors did not weigh in favor of relief. *See United States v. Escajeda*, 58 F.4th 184, 188 (5th Cir. 2023); *United States v. Evans*, 587 F.3d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 2009). At bottom, Jones’s § 3553(a) arguments largely amount to a disagreement with how the district court balanced the § 3553(a) factors, which is not a sufficient ground for reversal. *See Chambliss*, 948 F.3d at 694.

Additionally, Jones has not demonstrated that the district court’s finding that he had served less than 50 percent of his sentence, despite the possibility of early release to community custody, was clearly erroneous. *Chambliss* 948 F.3d at 693. Further, he has shown no legal error in the district court’s conclusion that “to give [Jones] a sentence of less than half of 210

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months would not reflect the seriousness of the offense, would not promote regard for the law, and would not afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B); *Chambliss*, 948 F.3d at 693-94.

Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Jones’s current motion based on the same § 3553(a) factors that it had cited in denying a prior compassionate release motion filed by Jones, despite the changed circumstances he raised in his current motion. Again, Jones raised those changed circumstances in his motion, and we assume that the district court considered them in denying his motion. *See Batiste*, 980 F.3d at 479. Furthermore, Jones fails to explain meaningfully how those changed circumstances should have impacted the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors.

AFFIRMED.