

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 26-10251

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 15, 2026

Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

L. J. BRITT,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:00-CR-260-15

Before ELROD, *Chief Judge*, and RICHMAN and DUNCAN, *Circuit Judges*.
PER CURIAM:*

L. J. Britt, federal prisoner # 22222-009, moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in his appeal from the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate release. Britt contends that he established extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting release, which the district court failed to consider individually or collectively, and that the district court wrongly concluded that it was required to impose life sentences

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.

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despite post-sentencing changes in the law. Britt argues that there exists an unwarranted sentencing disparity between his sentence and those imposed on similarly situated defendants sentenced under current laws and that such a disparity supports relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He states that the district court failed to weigh his post-sentencing rehabilitation and to provide reasons for its conclusion that the § 3553(a) factors did not warrant compassionate release. Finally, he contends that the district court abused its discretion in not considering his reply brief.

Britt has shown no arguable abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate release. *See United States v. Chambliss*, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). The court's order, albeit brief, stated that it had considered the parties' pleadings and the applicable law, and that based on the arguments in the government's response, Britt had failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting release and the § 3553(a) factors weighed heavily against granting relief. *See Chavez-Meza v. United States*, 585 U.S. 109, 116 (2018) ("In some cases, it may be sufficient for purposes of appellate review that the judge simply relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has considered the parties' arguments and taken account of the § 3553(a) factors, among others."). Britt's argument amounts to a disagreement with the district court's balancing of the § 3553(a) factors, which is not a sufficient ground for reversal. *See Chambliss*, 948 F.3d at 694. As Britt fails to identify a nonfrivolous argument that the district court abused its discretion by denying relief based on the balancing of the § 3553(a) factors, we need not consider any argument relating to extraordinary and compelling circumstances. *See United States v. Jackson*, 27 F.4th 1088, 1093 n.8 (5th Cir. 2022). Nor has Britt shown that the district court's failure to consider his reply, which was filed *after* the district court's order denying compassionate release and

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rehashed many of the same arguments already considered, was an abuse of discretion. *See Chambliss*, 948 F.3d at 694.

Accordingly, Britt's IFP motion is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. *See Baugh v. Taylor*, 117 F.3d 197, 202 & n.24 (5th Cir. 1997); *Howard v. King*, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.