

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

No. 25-50941
Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 18, 2026

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

ALBERTO MURGUIA,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 6:23-CR-234-2

Before CLEMENT, HAYNES, and RAMIREZ, *Circuit Judges*.

PER CURIAM:*

Alberto Murguia appeals his 420-month sentence, which he received after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine and at least five kilograms of cocaine. Murguia contends that the district court erred in applying a two-level

* This opinion is not designated for publication. *See* 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.

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enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises to manufacture or distribute drugs.

Murguia did not object to the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement in the district court, so our review is for plain error only. *See United States v. Benitez*, 809 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2015) (“When challenges to a district court’s interpretation or applications of sentencing guidelines are preserved, they are reviewed de novo; when unpreserved, they are reviewed for plain error.”). Murguia argues that the facts do not support the enhancement because the probation officer could not confirm Murguia’s home was actually located at the address Murguia provided, the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) identified a stash house but failed to include a residential address or description, and law enforcement never seized any controlled substances from the stash house. This does not constitute plain error, even if true.

The PSR, which the district court adopted without objection, identified a stash house that Murguia operated with a co-conspirator. Murguia did not object to the characterization of the premises as a “stash house” for controlled substances, nor did he object to the PSR’s statement that he operated the premises with a co-conspirator and met one of his drug distributors there. It does not matter that the probation officer was unable to confirm whether Murguia’s reported home address was correct. The enhancement was based on the stash house, not Murguia’s residence. And it does not matter that the PSR did not describe the stash house or identify what “type of residence” it was. Such details are unnecessary for a premises to fall under § 2D1.1(b)(12).

“At sentencing, the district court need not discuss all the facts and reasoning relevant to its guidelines calculation. An adoption of the PSR’s factual findings and conclusions is sufficient as long as those findings and conclusions are adequate to support the sentence imposed.” *United States v.*

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Eustice, 952 F.3d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The district court adopted the PSR, which contained sufficient grounds for the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement. The court therefore did not plainly err in imposing the two-level enhancement. *See Puckett v. United States*, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).

We AFFIRM.