

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 14, 2026

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

No. 25-20558
Summary Calendar

ROBERT STRANGE,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

U.S. BANK TRUST COMPANY, N.A.,

Defendant—Appellee,

versus

LANA STRANGE,

Third Party Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:23-CV-796

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ENGELHARDT, and RAMIREZ, *Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:*

* This opinion is not designated for publication. *See* 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.

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Pro se appellants Robert and Lana Strange challenge (1) the dismissal of their claim for a declaration that the statute of limitations for enforcing a lien on their property had expired, and (2) the entry of judgment in favor of the lienholder on its counterclaim for judicial foreclosure. We AFFIRM.

I

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment *de novo*, applying the same standards as the district court.” *Hagen v. Aetna Ins. Co.*, 808 F.3d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

II

The Stranges argue that the district court’s judgment “rests on multiple legal errors” and is contrary to controlling precedent. They contend, in conclusory fashion, that the district court failed to address their legal arguments concerning “acceleration, reinstatement, and limitations” and that its factual findings were “unsupported by competent summary-judgment evidence.”¹

As an initial matter, we do not consider any issues that the Stranges assert for the first time on appeal, *see Rollins v. Home Depot USA*, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the first instance in the district court—thus raising it for the first time on appeal[.]”), or that they first raise in their reply brief, *see Dixon v. Toyota*

¹ Because the Stranges fail to address the dismissal of their claims for fraud, fraud in the inducement, fraud by nondisclosure, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel, they have abandoned these claims on appeal. *See Yohey v. Collins*, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993).

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Motor Credit Corp., 794 F.3d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.”).

As for their remaining arguments, although we liberally construe *pro se* briefs, “*pro se* parties must still brief the issues and reasonably comply with the standards of Rule 28.” *Grant v. Cuellar*, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 requires that an appellant’s brief contain the appellant’s “contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); *see also* 5TH CIR. R. 28.2.2 (“Every assertion in briefs regarding matter in the record must be supported by a reference to the page number of the original record . . . where the matter is found using the record citation form as directed by the Clerk of Court.”). “A party may forfeit an argument through inadequate briefing in several ways, such as by failing to ‘offer any . . . citation to authority’ or by failing to ‘offer record citations.’” *Schnell v. State Farm Lloyds*, 98 F.4th 150, 161 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting *Rollins*, 8 F.4th at 397 & n.1). Because the Stranges’ brief contains no citations to the record, and none of their cited authorities supports their arguments, they have inadequately briefed, and therefore forfeited, them.

Nevertheless, we have considered the record on appeal, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, and find no reversible error.

AFFIRMED.