## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

## FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 94-40194 Summary Calendar

NAIL KHANFAR,

Petitioner,

versus

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(A29 397 304)

(August 10, 1994)

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, JONES and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:\*

Nail Khanfar, a Jordanian citizen born in Kuwait, entered the United States as a nonimmigrant student in 1982. Upon graduating from college in 1987 with an accounting degree he obtained

<sup>\*</sup>Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

employment, thereby violating the conditions of his immigration status. Conceding deportability in the ensuing proceedings, Khanfar sought suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.<sup>1</sup> The Immigration Judge denied his request and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Khanfar timely petitioned for review.

To establish eligibility for suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Act, an immigrant must show (1) continuous physical presence in the United States for the last seven years, (2) good moral character, and (3) extreme hardship if deported.<sup>2</sup> The Board affirmed the denial of suspension on the grounds that Khanfar had not shown extreme hardship. Our review of that determination is very limited; we look for abuse of discretion, which "we are entitled to find . . . only in a case where the hardship is uniquely extreme, at or closely approaching the outer limits of the most severe hardship the alien could suffer and so severe that any reasonable person would necessarily conclude that the hardship is extreme."<sup>3</sup>

At his hearing Khanfar testified that he would be unable to return to Kuwait because he had failed to renew his residency in accordance with a 1987 change in that country's immigration laws. He maintains that deportation to Jordan would work extreme hardship

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1).

 $<sup>^2 \</sup>mbox{Hernandez-Cordero v. INS}, 819 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>**Id**. at 563.

because he never lived there, spending at most two months there over the course of four visits. More specifically, Khanfar complains that he has no acquaintances or job prospects in Jordan and faces two years of conscripted military service. There is no language barrier.

The IJ held that to establish extreme hardship an alien must show more than a lack of knowledge of the country designated for deportation. The BIA adopted this reasoning. Applying the standard of review our *en banc* court adopted in **Hernandez-Cordero**, we must decline to disturb that determination. We cannot say that deportation to an unfamiliar country, without more, "closely approaches the outer limits of the most severe hardship the alien could suffer." Nor can we say that the hardship of orienting oneself to a new country is unique or that two years of military service for one's country of citizenship poses an extreme hardship.

Khanfar also complains that the BIA's review was cursory. We previously have held that the BIA has a procedural obligation to consider all relevant factors.<sup>4</sup> That responsibility was acquitted herein by the explicit adoption of the reasons set forth in the IJ's decision, which aptly grasped and addressed the essence of Khanfar's petition.<sup>5</sup>

The petition for review is DENIED and the decision of the BIA is AFFIRMED.

<sup>4</sup>Hernandez-Cordero.

<sup>5</sup>Panrit v. INS, 19 F.3d 544 (10th Cir. 1994).