United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 28, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-40031
Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MOHAMMED GOUJIL,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Consolidated with:

No. 03-40032
Summary Calendar

UNITES STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MOHAMMED GOUJIL, also known as Ramiro Munoz,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. C-02-CR-215-1
USDC No. C-01-CR-41-1

Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:[*]

Mohammed Goujil appeals the revocation of his supervised release term imposed in connection with his conviction for passport fraud. Goujil was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 24 months for the violation. Goujil also appeals his conviction following a jury trial for assault of a federal employee, for which he received a sentence of a term of imprisonment of 36 months, to run consecutive to his sentence imposed for the violation of the terms of his supervised release. Goujil argues that the district court judge plainly erred in both cases in failing to sua sponte recuse herself based on judicial bias and prejudice. A review of the record of all proceedings did not raise any type of inference that would have led a reasonably objective person to doubt the impartiality of the district court judge. See Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1988); 28 U.S.C. § 455. There was no indication that any of the district court's rulings were the result of a deep seated favoritism or antagonism. The district court did not plainly err in not recusing itself from presiding over the proceedings. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-55.

The judgments in both cases are AFFIRMED.

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[*] Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.