



the two year statute of limitations period for his causes of action based upon his termination of employment. See *Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, Ala.*, 612 F.2d 974, 977 (5th Cir. 1980). The mere perpetuation of the effects of the termination decision while on administrative appeal does not constitute a continuing violation. See *Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D.*, 980 F.2d 1514, 1521-22 (5th Cir. 1993); *Dumas*, 612 F.2d at 977-78. Thus, the district court did not err in granting Lumberton's FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal as to Allen's claims arising from his termination in 1986.

2. Allen's state constitutional claims were not tolled while he pursued state administrative remedies, because state constitutional claims are not affected by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies such that they must be originally considered by the state administrative agency. See *Texas Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks I.S.D.*, 830 S.W.2d 88, 91 n.3 (Tex. 1992). Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Allen's state constitutional claims arising out of his termination in 1986.

3. Allen presented no competent summary judgment evidence to support his post-termination claims and to avoid summary judgment on behalf of Lumberton. Thus, the district court did not err in granting Lumberton's motion for summary judgment.