

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 94-20086  
(Summary Calendar)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MAURICIO RUEBEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Southern District of Texas  
(CR H 91 59-7)

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(March 31, 1995)

Before DUHÉ, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:\*

In this direct criminal appeal by Defendant-Appellant Mauricio Rueben<sup>1</sup>, the sole issue of consequence is whether the plea

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\*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

<sup>1</sup>In the record, the defendant's surname is spelled "Rueben"; however, in his appellate brief, he spells his name "Reuben." For record consistency, we here use the spelling used in the record.

agreement between Rueben and the government was breached when the government in its discretion determined that Rueben had failed to provide substantial assistance and thus refused to file a motion for a downward departure at sentencing. Concluding that in the plea agreement the government retained its discretion, and in exercising it acted neither arbitrarily and capriciously when determining that Rueben had failed to provide substantial assistance nor unconstitutionally or with an unconstitutional motive in not filing the motion to depart downward, we affirm the rulings of the district court and thus the sentences it imposed on Rueben.

## I

### FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rueben pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 1000 kilograms of marijuana and money laundering. The plea agreement provided that the government would file a motion for a downward departure if in its discretion Rueben was determined to have provided substantial assistance.

Rueben was interviewed several times by a government agent and two prosecutors. After the second interview, the prosecutors were convinced that Rueben was not being completely truthful, was backtracking, and was not fully admitting his own guilt. That in turn led the government to conclude that Rueben had not provided substantial assistance and that it was not bound to file a motion for downward departure based on substantial assistance.

Rueben filed a motion to delay sentencing and sought a hearing on his assertion that the government had breached the plea agreement. He also filed a motion for discovery to prepare for that hearing. The district court granted a delay in sentencing, after which Rueben filed a motion for specific performance of the plea agreement or, alternatively, to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court ordered the government to bring specified documents to the hearing for the court to examine and then determine which if any of the documents should be furnished to Rueben.

The district court conducted that hearing, and Rueben's counsel received copies of notes taken by the government during its interviews of Rueben. After the hearing, the district court determined that the government had made a prima facie showing that it had a rational basis for refusing to file a substantial assistance motion for downward departure under § 5K1.1 of the guidelines; and the court denied Rueben's motion for specific performance of the plea agreement. In its subsequent memorandum opinion the court stated that the subject notes "demonstrate the government's contemporaneous concern over the veracity and comprehensiveness of Rueben's testimony. These concerns are valid, supported by the evidence, and enough to justify the government's exercise of discretion."

The district court sentenced Rueben to a 360 month term of imprisonment for the conspiracy offense, followed by a 10-year term of supervised release, and a concurrent 240-month term of imprisonment on the money laundering offense, followed by a 3-year

term of supervised release. Rueben timely filed a notice of appeal.<sup>2</sup>

## II

### ANALYSIS

Rueben contends that he is entitled to a downward departure for providing substantial assistance to the government, and that the government's arbitrary, bad faith refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion constituted a due process violation. He also insists that he is entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement.

"[W]hen a guilty plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." United States v. Valencia, 985 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Rueben, as the party alleging a breach of the plea agreement, bears the burden of proving the underlying facts establishing a breach by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 46 (5th Cir. 1993). To determine whether the government breached the plea agreement, the court must consider "whether the government's conduct is consistent with the parties' reasonable understanding of the agreement." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). This inquiry is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.

The government's decision to seek a reduction of the

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<sup>2</sup>Rueben's notice of appeal will be treated as filed on the date of and after the entry of the judgment under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).

defendant's sentence is discretionary. See Wade v. United States, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843-44 (1992). The government nevertheless may bargain away this discretion in a plea agreement. United States v. Watson, 988 F.2d 544, 552 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 698 (1994). We review the language of the plea agreement to determine if the government has retained its discretion to file a § 5K1.1 motion or has negotiated it away. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 47; Watson, 988 F.2d at 548.

Based on the following language in the plea agreement in Garcia-Bonilla, we found that the government had retained absolute discretion concerning whether to file a § 5K1.1 downward departure motion: "The defendant agrees that the decision whether to file [a 5K1.1] motion rests within the sole discretion of the United States." Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 47. In contrast, we held in Watson that the following language did not reserve the government's discretion to file a § 5K1.1 motion: "[I]f the defendant complies with section 5K1.1 of the sentencing guidelines, the Government will file a motion . . . asking for a downward departure . . . ." Watson, 988 F.2d at 548. See also United States v. Wilder, 15 F.3d 1292, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994) (plea agreement stating government will file motion "in the event it is determined that [Wilder] provides substantial assistance" bound government to file motion).

When the government does retain its discretion to file the motion for sentence reduction, "a defendant who provides substantial assistance without receiving a downward departure is not entitled to a remedy or even to discovery or an evidentiary

hearing' unless the prosecution relied on an unconstitutional motive" in refusing to file the motion. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 46 (quoting Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844). Generalized allegations of an improper motive are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844. On the other hand, when the government does not retain discretion, "a district court has authority to determine whether a defendant has satisfied the terms of his plea agreement, even if one of those terms deals with assistance to the government." Watson, 988 F.2d at 553.

Here, the district court reviewed the circumstances to determine whether the government had a rational basis for refusing to file the motion. The district court did not make an express finding whether the government had retained discretion to file a § 5K1.1 motion in the plea agreement. Rather, in evaluating the plea agreement, that court in effect analyzed the case both ways: It considered whether the government correctly determined that Rueben had not provided substantial assistance; and it considered whether the government's refusal to file the motion was so arbitrary as to be unconstitutional. In so doing, the district court concluded that the government's interview notes established that its concern "over the veracity and comprehensiveness of Rueben's testimony . . . [was] valid, supported by the evidence, and enough to justify the government's exercise of discretion." The district court also concluded that the government had a rational basis for refusing to file the motion, and therefore did not act so arbitrarily as to be unconstitutional.

The plea agreement in the instant case provides in pertinent part that "[i]f in the judgment and sole discretion of the United States, the defendant's cooperation amounts to 'substantial assistance,' the United States will file a motion for departure pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements which motion will recommend that the defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 15 years, not including supervised release." (emphasis added). The plea agreement also provides that "the defendant understands and agrees that the decision to file a motion for substantial assistance pursuant to 5K1.1 rests entirely with the United States. The defendant acknowledges that the refusal to file such a motion is not grounds for withdrawal of his guilty plea."

The language of the plea agreement in this case differs somewhat from that in both the Watson and Garcia-Bonilla agreements. The instant plea agreement provides, in the declarative mood, that the government "will" not, in the imperative mood, shall file a § 5K1.1 motion, if in its "judgment and sole discretion," the government determines that Rueben has provided substantial assistance. The agreement sub judice also provides that the decision to file the motion "rests entirely with the United States." The latter language closely resembles the language in Garcia-Bonilla. Although the instant agreement does not specifically state that the government retains "sole discretion" to make the motion, it employs that phrase to condition the obligation of the government in determining whether

"substantial assistance" has been provided by Rueben. When read in context, the semantical differences between these phrases and those in Garcia-Bonilla do not constitute a legal distinction. Also, the instant agreement's statement that the government "will" (not shall) file the motion, being expressly conditioned on the government's discretionary determination whether Rueben has provided substantial assistance, clearly constitutes retention by the government of its discretion concerning the filing of a § 5K1.1 motion. Thus, only an arbitrary and capricious determination by the government that Rueben failed to provide substantial assistance, or a showing of an unconstitutional motive on the part of the government, could entitle Rueben to relief.

Rueben has clearly failed to meet his burden of showing that the government was arbitrary and capricious, i.e., that it abused its discretion, in concluding that he failed to provide substantial assistance. As ordered by the court, the government presented its interview notes, which reflected that Rueben's statements were inconsistent with those of his co-defendants and were not completely truthful. Additionally, Rueben made no specific allegations and presented no evidence to show that he furnished substantial assistance to, and fully cooperated with, the government. Rather, he merely made a generalized allegation that he provided substantial assistance. His conclusional allegations are not sufficient to establish that the district court erred in finding that the government's refusal to file the motion was supported by the evidence and had a rational basis.



Rueben has also failed to make specific allegations or to present any evidence showing that the government acted unconstitutionally or had an unconstitutional motive for not filing the § 5K1.1 motion. Again, his generalized allegation that the government acted arbitrarily and in bad faith falls well short of that which is needed to establish a constitutional violation.

Neither has Rueben shown that he is entitled to additional discovery or to an evidentiary hearing. The district court permitted limited additional discovery when it ordered the government to provide copies to Rueben of notes taken during the government's interviews of Rueben. Moreover, the court did hold a hearing on Rueben's motion for specific performance of the plea agreement. Although Rueben's counsel presented only oral argument at the hearing, he had the opportunity to present other evidence supporting Rueben's allegations, assuming any such evidence existed.

Given the absence of merit in Rueben's claim, we are satisfied that the district court correctly determined that "Rueben [was] not entitled to [additional] discovery because the evidence already discovered [was] sufficient." For the foregoing reasons, the rulings of the district court are, in all respects, AFFIRMED.