IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 92-1771

Summary Calendar

IN THE MATTER OF: JEFFREY RALEIGH HALL and SUZANNE CROUCH HALL,

DEBTORS.

JEFFREY RALEIGH HALL and SUZANNE CROUCH HALL,

Appellants,

versus

DANIEL J. SHERMAN,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (3:92 CV 798 R)

(October 22, 1993)

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Halls allege two errors in the handling of their personal bankruptcy. They claim that the bankruptcy judge presiding over their case should have been recused and that the bankruptcy court erred in ordering the resetting of the creditors' meeting required

^{*}Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

by 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) and the bar dates running from the time of that meeting. We reject both of appellants' arguments and affirm the decisions of the courts below.

Appellants' recusal argument is based on an affidavit they filed alleging the bankruptcy judge's bias and prejudice. Among other requirements, such an affidavit must state material facts with particularity and be based on personal knowledge. <u>See</u> 28 U.S.C. § 144; <u>Henderson v. Dep't of Publ. Safety & Corrections</u>, 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1990). The affidavit filed in this case is filled with conclusions, speculations, and statements not based on the affiant's first-hand knowledge. Mr. Hall refused to testify further with regard to his motion. Denial of the motion as being based on a legally insufficient affidavit was proper under such circumstances.

The second complaint involves the setting of new bar dates for creditors' claims. Bankruptcy Rules 4004 and 4007 require that a complaint to determine dischargeability be filed within 60 days of the first date set for a creditors' meeting pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341(a). In this case, Mr. Hall procured a stay before the original date set for the section 341 meeting. Based upon testimony at a hearing on the issue, the bankruptcy court concluded that the stay had been obtained by Mr. Hall without giving the judge full information, and that the section 341 meeting needed rescheduling to prevent an abuse of process. After reviewing the hearing, we cannot say the court's conclusion about abuse of process was clearly erroneous. The court's rescheduling order was

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thus proper under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). <u>See generally Matter of</u> <u>Jones</u>, 966 F.2d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[a] bankruptcy court has the equitable power and the duty to sift the circumstances surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in administration of the bankrupt estate").

AFFIRMED.