United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

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FILED

No. 23-20312

March 14, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

IN THE MATTER OF KIRBY INLAND MARINE, LP, OWNER OF M/V SABINAL, FOR EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

KIRBY INLAND MARINE, L.P., OWNER OF M/V SABINAL,

Petitioner—Appellee,

versus

DANIEL SANCHEZ,

Claimant—Appellant,

INTERCONTINENTAL TERMINALS COMPANY, L.L.C.,

Claimant—Appellee,

IN THE MATTER OF KIRBY INLAND MARINE, LP, OWNER OF M/V SABINAL, FOR EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

KIRBY INLAND MARINE, L.P., OWNER OF M/V SABINAL,

Petitioner—Appellee,

versus

MICHAEL RANDOLPH,

Claimant—Appellant,

INTERCONTINENTAL TERMINALS COMPANY, L.L.C.,

Claimant—Appellee,

In the Matter of Kirby Inland Marine, LP, Owner of M/V Sabinal, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability

KIRBY INLAND MARINE, L.P., OWNER OF M/V SABINAL,

Petitioner—Appellee,

versus

DAVID HAYES,

Claimant—Appellant,

INTERCONTINENTAL TERMINALS COMPANY, L.L.C.,

Claimant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC Nos. 4:21-CV-2965, 4:21-CV-2966, 4:21-CV-2967

Before Wiener, Haynes, and Higginson, *Circuit Judges*.

Per Curiam:*

^{*} This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.

No. 23-20312

Claimants-Appellants Daniel Sanchez, Michael Randolph, and David Hayes (the "Seaman-Claimants") appeal the district court's order denying their motion to lift the limitation stay imposed by the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. § 30511(c). The Seaman-Claimants argue that Claimant-Appellee Intercontinental Terminals Company's ("ITC") claims against Petitioner-Appellee Kirby Inland Marine, LP ("Kirby") are invalid and thus ITC's refusal to enter stipulations consistent with our decision in Odeco Oil & Gas Co., Drilling Division v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 1996) is not an impediment to lifting the stay. However, the district court has never ruled on the validity of ITC's claims against Kirby; in fact, the Seaman-Claimants' motion to dismiss those claims remains pending. We therefore REMAND for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to expeditiously consider the Seaman-Claimants' motion to dismiss in the first instance, and we retain jurisdiction over this limited remand pending the district court's ruling on the motion to dismiss. See United States v. Gomez, 905 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2018). After that court's ruling, this appeal shall return to the same panel.

This case is REMANDED FOR LIMITED CONSIDERATION CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.