## FILED

## IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

November 3, 2003

FOR	THE	FIFTH	<b>CIRCUIT</b>

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk

No. 02-51304

PAUL DAVID WOOSLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE ADOPTION ALLIANCE; CAROL R. HABERMAN, Judge, 45th District Court; BEXAR COUNTY 225TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; ALMA L. LOPEZ, Justice, Fourth Court of Appeals District,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (USDC No. SA-02-CV-372-FB)

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Before REAVLEY, HIGGINBOTHAM and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:\*

Without reaching the other grounds for dismissal, we agree with the district court that this action is barred under the <u>Rooker-Feldman</u> doctrine, because appellant is

<sup>\*</sup>Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

attempting to overturn the state court judgments denying his requests to vacate the decree of adoption and decree of termination. Those judgments are not void for lack of jurisdiction so as to fall within an exception to the doctrine. The Supreme Court has held that "a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings." D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). When the federal "court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to conduct such a review." Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). We find no recognized exception or limitation on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applicable to this case. Even if Woosley's complaint is characterized as a due process challenge to the procedures employed by the state court, the suit in federal court is nevertheless barred. See Liedke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED.